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Abstract
We analyze the effect of public information on rational investors’ incentives to reveal
private information during the bookbuilding process and their demand for alloca-
tions in the IPO. Our model generates several new predictions. First, investors
require more underpricing to truthfully reveal positive private information in bear
markets than in bull markets (the incentive effect). Second, the fraction of positive
private signals and of underpriced IPOs is increasing in market returns (the demand
effect). Combined, these two effects can explain why IPO underpricing is positively
related to pre-issue market returns, consistent with extant evidence. Using a sample
of 5,000 U.S. IPOs from 1981-2008, we show that the empirical implications of the
model are borne out in the data.
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1 Introduction
Extant evidence shows that underpricing in initial public offerings (IPOs) is positively
related to market-wide equity returns preceding the offering, suggesting that underwrit-
ers fail to fully adjust offer prices for publicly available information. As pointed out
by Loughran and Ritter (2002) and Lowry and Schwert (2004) among others, partial
adjustment to prior market returns is puzzling since it implies that underwriters reward
investors for easily available public information.1
In this paper, we offer a rational explanation for partial adjustment to public infor-
mation. Our model is based on the framework of Benveniste and Spindt (1989), where
underwriters underprice IPOs to compensate investors for revealing private information
during the subscription period. While their main prediction is that offer prices will
adjust partially to investors’ private information, this paper shows that it can also be
rational with partial adjustment to public information. This is because publicly available
information affects the incentives of investors to reveal their private information as well
as their demand for allocations.
More specifically, the model shows that investors require higher compensation, i.e.
more underpricing, to truthfully reveal favorable information when the public signal is
negative. The intuition for this result starts with the underwriter’s optimal rule for
the allocation of shares in the IPO, which favors investors revealing positive private
signals. In our model, as long as at least one investor reports a positive signal, investors
reporting negative information will be left without any IPO allocation. Since public and
private signals are conditionally correlated, the probability of being awarded underpriced
shares after hiding good information is higher when public information is negative. The
expected gains from lying about favorable private information are therefore higher in
downmarkets than in upmarkets. As a result, negative market-wide information increases
the need for the underwriter to underprice the issue in order to induce investors to
truthfully reveal their positive information. We label this mechanism the incentive effect.
At the same time, public information also affects the distribution in investors’ de-
mand for allocations. We refer to this mechanism as the demand effect. To start with,
1See also Logue (1973), Hanley (1993), Bradley and Jordan (2002), Benveniste, Ljungqvist, Wilhelm,
and Yu (2003), and Kutsuna, Smith, and Smith (2009). Using French IPOs, Derrien and Womack
(2003) show that the offer price adjusts more fully to market returns in auctions than in the bookbuilding
process. Da, Engelberg, and Gao (2009) and Liu, Sherman, and Zhang (2009) find that IPO underpricing
increases with pre-IPO media coverage.
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investors have little incentive to hide negative private information and don’t require any
underpricing to truthfully reveal a negative signal. When public information is positive,
private information is likely to also be favorable, and hence the probability for under-
pricing of the shares in the offering is relatively high. Thus, through the demand effect,
positive public information increases the probability that the IPO is underpriced.
The relative strength of the two effects determines how public information ultimately
is related to underpricing. While the incentive effect produces a negative relation between
public information and underpricing, the demand effect pulls in the opposite direction.
Whenever the demand effect dominates the incentive effect, underpricing is positively
related to public information and the offer price is only partially adjusted for market-
wide returns. This is the case if the number of investors in the issue is sufficiently
large.
We test the empirical implications of the model for a sample of 5,000 U.S. IPOs in
the period 1981-2008. As a proxy for private information, we use the residual from a
regression of the offer price revision at the end of the registration period on the S&P500
index, effectively purging any effect of market-wide returns from the price update. The
predictions of the model are all borne out in the data. Importantly, for a given increase
in private information, the first-day returns increase more in bear markets than in bull
markets (the incentive effect). This effect is concentrated to issues where demand for
the shares offered in the IPO is high. Moreover, the probability of positive private
information and of positive initial returns is higher when public information is favorable
(the demand effect).
Our evidence is consistent with the incentive mechanism implied by the information
production argument of Benveniste and Spindt (1989). The ideal way to test this in-
centive mechanism is to relate actual allocations of shares to investors’ indications of
interest, but this requires proprietary data that is not easily available.2 A more indirect
test is to look for partial adjustment in the IPO price to private information obtained
during the subscription period, as first done by Hanley (1993).3 We refine this indirect
test of information revelation by making the incentive mechanism contingent on pub-
2Cornelli and Goldreich (2001, 2003) and Jenkinson and Jones (2004) examine proprietary bid and
allocation data from two separate U.K. investment banks. Bubna and Prabhala (2010) use similar data
from Indian IPOs. While Cornelli and Goldreich as well as Bubna and Prabhala find support for the
Benveniste and Spindt (1989) model, Jenkinson and Jones do not.
3Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2002) estimate a structural model of IPO allocations and find greater insti-
tutional allocations to be associated with larger price revisions, consistent with information production.
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lic information observed during the subscription period. As predicted by our model,
it appears that the compensation investors require to reveal their private information
is higher in downmarkets than in upmarkets. In other words, investors’ private infor-
mation seems to be more fully incorporated into the IPO price in upmarkets than in
downmarkets.
Several papers have analyzed the partial adjustment of the IPO offer price to public
information. Loughran and Ritter (2002) use prospect theory to explain the observed
positive relation between market returns and underpricing. They argue that issuers care
more for their newly discovered wealth than about leaving “money on the table”, thus
bargaining the price less aggressively when market-wide stock returns are high. Derrien
(2005) proposes that investor sentiment correlated to market conditions drives demand
and hence initial returns in hot market IPOs.
In Edelen and Kadlec (2005), a rational issuer sets the offer price by trading off
the proceeds conditional on deal success against the likelihood that the IPO fails. If the
conditional gains from an IPO are high, the issue will be priced relatively low to increase
the probability of success. Assuming that the market value of the firm increases with
that of its publicly traded competitors, the degree of underpricing will increase with
industry-wide stock returns. In a Rock (1986) setting, Leite (2007) shows that positive
public information reduces adverse selection and thus the winner’s curse problem. At the
same time, issuers price the issue more conservatively to increase the success probability,
creating a positive correlation between market returns and the degree of underpricing.
Finally, Sherman (2005) shows that partial adjustment will arise in the Benveniste and
Spindt (1989) model if rational investors’ opportunity costs are positively related to
public information observed prior to the offering. In our model, information costs play
no role and partial adjustment is related directly to information revelation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. The
relation between public information and underpricing is discussed in Section 3. In Section
4, we report the result from our empirical tests of the model. Section 5 summarizes.
2 The model
We start with a firm that is about to offer its shares to outside investors through an
IPO. The firm’s value is good G = 1 with probability α and bad B = 0 with probability
1 − α. For simplicity, the number of shares to be floated is normalized to one, and
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investors are allocated fractions of this one share. All agents are risk neutral, and the
risk-free interest rate is zero.
There are N ≥ 2 investors participating in the offering, each observing an indepen-
dently identically distributed (i.i.d.) private signal sI = {gI , bI}, where gI represents
positive information and bI negative information about the firm. Let n ∈ [0, N ] denote
the number of investors who observe positive private signals. Investors observe their
private signals at zero cost.4 The precision in the private signal sI is similar across all
investors and equals γ = q(gI |G) = q(bI |B) > 1/2, where q(·|·) and q(·) denote condi-
tional and unconditional probabilities throughout. The assumption that γ > 1/2 ensures
that the signal is informative about the true value of the firm.
In addition, all investors observe a common public signal s = {g, b}, where s = g
represents positive information and s = b negative information. We can think of the
public signal as market-wide information—such as changes in aggregate demand or the
business cycle—that affects the value of the firm. The precision in the public signal
is given by f = q(g|G) = q(b|B), where f > 1/2. The public and the private signals
are both informative and therefore positively conditionally correlated. That is, if the
public signal is positive, then the probability of also obtaining a positive private signal
is relatively high, and vice versa: q(gI |g) > q(bI |g) and q(gI |b) < q(bI |b).
Let v(n, s) denote the (true) aftermarket value of the firm, i.e. the value of the firm
after it is publicly listed. The aftermarket value is assumed to fully reflect all available
information at the time of the offering. That is, the function v(n, s) is the expected
value of the firm conditional on the n positive private signals observed by investors and
the public signal s. The specification of v(n, s) as a conditional expectation implies that
the marginal impact of each investor’s private signal on the firm’s aftermarket value
is decreasing in the number of investors in the offering (N). This is in contrast to
Benveniste and Spindt (1989), who assume that the aftermarket value is additive in
investors’ private signals and hence that each private signal “has an equal (absolute)
marginal impact on the stock’s value” (p. 347).
Because the aftermarket value of the firm increases in the number n of positive private
signals, n is also a measure of the demand for shares in the issue, and where a higher
4We treat the number of investors N as exogenous. As an alternative, one could assume a positive
information cost and let N be determined endogenously, with N being negatively related to the cost
of information. Our assumption of zero information cost yields no loss of insight in the information
revelation mechanism. See Sherman and Titman (2002) for an analysis of the effect of costly private
information and participation limits in a Benveniste and Spindt (1989) setup.
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value of n corresponds to higher demand. Indeed, the case for which n = N , and hence
all investors observe positive private signals, is referred to as the high-demand state. In
contrast, the case for which n = 0 and all investors observe negative private signals, is
called the low-demand state.
The bookbuilding process is conducted as follows. Investors observe their private
signals along with the public signal. Bids are submitted to the underwriter effectively
by reporting the private signal. Each investor submits a high or low bid, which is to
say that she reports either a positive or negative signal. In equilibrium, an investor who
observes a positive private signal reports this truthfully by bidding high. Similarly, an
investor with a negative signal truthfully reports this by submitting a low bid.
The firm pays no fees for the services of the underwriter. Before investors submit
their bids, the underwriter states his pricing and allocation policy. He then responds
to investors’ bids according to this pre-committed policy. In equilibrium, the under-
writer receives all the relevant information from investors about the firm. Thus, when
determining the offer price, he correctly anticipates the firm’s aftermarket value v(n, s).5
Let p(n, s) denote the IPO price if n investors report positive private signals (sI = gI)
and given the public signal s. Let z(g, n) denote the fraction of the issue allocated to an
investor who submits a high bid, and z(b, n) denote the fraction awarded to an investor
submitting a low bid. Since all private signals have the same precision, investors with
identical bids receive equal allocations. In other words, the issue is allocated pro-rata
among investors who submit identical bids. We assume, as do Benveniste and Spindt
(1989), that the issuer is committed to price the firm at or below its aftermarket value,
so that p(n, s) ≤ v(n, s). Unlike Benveniste and Spindt (1989), however, we place no
restrictions on the number of shares that can be allocated to one investor. This implies
that an entire issue may be allocated to one investor. As discussed below, as long as at
least one investor observes a positive private signal, it is optimal to allocate the issue
exclusively to investors with favorable information.
Let us now consider investors’ incentives to truthfully reveal their private signals.
Trivially, an investor with negative information has little incentive to misrepresent her
signal. If she lies and submits a high bid, she is awarded a fraction of the issue at a price
exceeding the after-market firm value implied by her private signal. Thus, she is better
off truthfully submitting a low bid, and possibly be allocated a share of the IPO at a
5Since in our model the number of shares is one, the offer price is equal to the proceeds in the IPO.
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price correctly reflecting her negative signal.
Instead, we need to worry about the incentives of investors with positive private
signals. These investors may benefit from misrepresenting their private information,
pretending to posses a negative signal in order to lower the issue price. The potential
drawback of such a strategy is, however, that other investors may submit high bids,
leaving the untruthful investor without any allocation in the offering.
For an investor i with a positive private signal, the expected payoff U from submitting
a high bid that truthfully reveals her signal is
U =
N∑
n=1
q(n|gI , s)z(g, n)[v(n, s)− p(n, s)], (1)
where q(n|gI , s) is the probability that a total of n investors receive positive private
signals conditional on investor i observing the private signal sI = gI and the public
signal s. Recall that z(g, n) is the fraction of the issue allocated to investor i for a given
n if she submits a high bid. The expected payoff to investor i is thus her fraction of the
IPO initial returns, probability-weighted across different n.
The expected payoff Uˆ to the same investor from misrepresenting her information by
submitting a low bid equals
Uˆ =
N∑
n=1
q(n|gI , s)z(b, n)[v(n, s)− p(n− 1, s)]. (2)
For a given n and s, the offer price is now lower, p(n−1, s) < p(n, s), and the probability
of receiving an allocation in the IPO is now z(b, n) < z(g, n). That is, by submitting a
low bid, the investor would get a higher return for a given allocation, but at the same
time risks getting a smaller (or no) fraction of the shares in the issue.
The payoff Uˆ is the minimum rent for an investor with a positive private signal and
Uˆ hence represents the reservation value to such an investor.6 To induce this investor
to truthfully reveal her signal, the expected payoff U from bidding high must be equal
to or exceed the expected profits Uˆ from submitting a low bid. The issue must thus be
priced and allocated to satisfy the truth-telling (incentive) constraint U ≥ Uˆ .
6As discussed above, investors with negative private information earn zero informational rents in
equilibrium.
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The expected proceeds Epi from the IPO are given by
Epi =
N∑
n=0
q(n, s)p(n, s). (3)
Formally, the objective of the underwriter (firm) is to maximize Epi with respect to
allocations z(s, n) and prices p(s, n) subject to the incentive constraint U ≥ Uˆ . Since
issuance costs are determined exclusively by investors’ informational rents Uˆ , maximizing
Epi is equivalent to minimizing Uˆ . The underwriter will further price and allocate the
issue such that the investor’s truth-telling constraint is satisfied as an equality, U = Uˆ .
The absence of allocation restrictions allows the underwriter to allocate shares only
to investors who submit high bids (i.e. report positive private information), regardless
of the number of investors submitting high bids. In equilibrium, this allocation rule
sets z(b, n) = 0 for all n > 0. That is, investors reporting a negative signal get a
zero allocation as long as at least one investor reports a positive signal. This in turn
minimizes the expected gains Uˆ from hiding a positive signal and thus maximizes the
IPO proceeds Epi. In the event that all investors obtain negative signals (n = 0), and in
equilibrium submit low bids, the issue is allocated pro-rata among the N investors. In
other words, the issue is never withdrawn in the low-demand state.7
The given allocation rule implies that an investor who submits a low bid receives no
shares unless the remaining N − 1 investors also submit low bids, in which case each
investor is allocated a fraction 1/N of the issue. The underwriter further reduces Uˆ
(and hence increases Epi) by not underpricing the issue in the low-demand state; i.e.,
by setting p(0, s) = v(0, s). The expected payoff to an investor with a positive private
signal from submitting a low bid is now
Uˆ = q(1|gI , s) 1
N
[v(1, s)− v(0, s)], (4)
which is strictly positive since v(1, s) > v(0, s).
The expected payoff to an investor with a positive private signal from truthfully
7Busaba (2006) shows that it may be optimal to commit to withdraw the issue with a positive
probability if demand is low. Busaba, Benveniste, and Guo (2001) find empirically that such a threat
reduces underpricing. In our setting, however, it is never optimal to withdraw the issue.
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revealing his signal by submitting a high bid is
U =
N∑
n=1
q(n|gI , s) 1
n
[v(n, s)− p(n, s)]. (5)
The set of prices p(n, s); n = 1, . . . , N that satisfies the investor’s incentive constraint
U = Uˆ is indeterminate, since there are N prices to be determined from only one
constraint. For tractability and without loss of generality, let the issue be fairly priced
(no underpricing), so that p(n, s) = v(n, s) for each n = 1, . . . , N − 1. Now the offer
price in the high-demand state, p(N, s), is uniquely determined from U = Uˆ . With
Uˆ > 0, it follows that U > 0, which requires that p(N, s) < v(N, s). That is, the issue
is underpriced in the high-demand state where all investors observe positive private
signals.8
Since the issue price is set to the firm’s aftermarket value v(n, s) in all states where
n < N , the payoff in these states are zero (U = 0|n < N). The expected payoff to
an investor with a positive signal of submitting a high bid therefore collapses to the
expected payoff in the high-demand state where n = N :
U = q(N |gI , s) 1
N
[v(N, s)− p(N, s)]. (6)
The offer price p(N, s) in the high-demand state is determined from the investor’s in-
centive constraint U = Uˆ , which gives
p(N, s) = v(N, s)− q(1|gI , s)
q(N |gI , s) [v(1, s)− v(0, s)]. (7)
Since v(1, s) > v(0, s), the issue is at all times underpriced in the high-demand state,
i.e., p(N, s) < v(N, s). With fair pricing in the remaining demand states, the issue is
underpriced in expectation.
The initial return associated with the high-demand state is given by
r(N, s) =
v(N, s)
p(N, s)
− 1. (8)
8The indeterminacy of prices comes from the absence of allocation restrictions, which allows the
underwriter to optimally allocate shares only to investors who report positive information (except when
all investors submit low bids). In the other extreme, requiring pro-rata allocations to all N investors, it
will be strictly optimal to price the issue fairly in all states for which n < N and to underprice the issue
only in the high-demand state n = N .
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Thus, the expected initial return equals
Er(s) = q(N |s)r(N, s), (9)
which measures the expected underpricing of the issue.
The analysis so far has established that IPOs are expected to be underpriced in order
to induce truthful revelation of positive private information, similar to Benveniste and
Spindt (1989). In the next section, we go beyond this standard argument and examine
the relation between public information and underpricing.
3 Public information and underpricing
As shown in Equation (9) above, the expected IPO initial return, Er(s), is the
product of the initial return in the high-demand state, r(N, s), and the probability that
this state occurs, q(N |s). An key contribution of this paper is the insight that the public
signal affects the expected initial return through both r(N, s) and q(N |s). This insight
is summarized in our first proposition.
Proposition 1 (i) The initial return in the high-demand state is negatively related to
the public signal s, so that r(N, g) < r(N, b). (ii) The probability of the high-demand
state, and hence the probability that the IPO is underpriced, is positively related to the
public signal, i.e., q(N |g) > q(N |b).
A formal proof of proposition 1 is in the Appendix. The public signal affects initial
returns in the high-demand state through investors’ incentives to truthfully reveal their
positive signals. In particular, the likelihood of being allocated shares in the IPO for
an investor concealing her positive private information is higher when the public signal
is negative, q(1|gI , b) > q(1|gI , g).9 Accordingly, the expected gains from lying are
negatively correlated to the public signal and so are investors’ incentives to hide favorable
information. As a result, the amount of underpricing required by investors to reveal their
positive signals is lower when the public outlook is good. We call this mechanism the
incentive effect. Contrary to extant evidence of partial adjustment to public information,
the incentive effect suggests a negative relationship between public information and
underpricing.
9Formally, it is required that q(1|gI , b)/q(N |gI , b) > q(1|gI , g)/q(N |gI , g).
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However, the public signal also impacts the probability q(N |s) that there is suffi-
cient demand—that the number of positive signals n is sufficiently high—for the issue to
be underpriced. Specifically, positive public information increases the probability that
investors obtain favorable private signals and hence submit high bids. We label this
mechanism the demand effect. Obviously, a higher probability that investors have favor-
able private information increases the likelihood that the issue is underpriced in the first
place. Thus, through the demand effect, the probability that an issue is underpriced is
positively related to the public signal.
The incentive effect and the demand effect have opposite implications for the rela-
tionship between public information and underpricing. Proposition 1 therefore allows
expected initial returns to be positively or negatively related to the public signal, de-
pending on which of the two effects that dominates. The next proposition shows that as
long as the number of investors in the issue is sufficiently large the demand effect will
dominate.
Proposition 2 Whenever the number of investors in the issue, N , is sufficiently large,
the demand effect strictly dominates the incentive effect. In this case, initial returns are
positively related to public information.
See the Appendix for a formal proof. As the number of investors in the issue increases,
the marginal impact of each investor’s signal on the aftermarket value of the firm declines.
This reduces the potential payoff, v(1, s)− v(0, s), to the investor of hiding her positive
private signal, lowering the amount of underpricing required to induce truthful revelation.
In other words, an increase in the number of investors decreases the relative importance
of the incentive effect. Once the demand effect strictly dominates, the public signal will
be positively related to underpricing. Indeed, Proposition 2 predicts a positive relation
between public information and initial returns—consistent with partial adjustment to
public information—whenever the number of investors in the issue is sufficiently large.
The result that the incentive effect weakens with the number of investors N is critical
to our model. It stems from our assumption that the aftermarket value of the firm
represents the expected value of the firm conditional on investors’ private signals and
the public signal, which in turn ensures that the marginal impact on firm value of each
investor’s signal declines in N . This result exists in any standard micro structure model
where investors’ private information is reflected in the stock’s price through the trading
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process.10 It does not, however, arise in the Benveniste and Spindt (1989) setup where
each investor’s signal has constant marginal value.
Overall, our model provides a rational explanation for the empirical fact that offer
prices adjust only partially to pre-issue market returns. We propose that this partial
adjustment is the result of favorable private information and a following high demand for
shares in the issue. We further identify a counteracting incentive effect, which produces
a negative relationship between public information and underpricing. As long as investor
demand in the IPO is sufficiently high, the demand effect will dominate, resulting in a
positive correlation between initial returns and market returns.
Table 1 summarizes how the incentive and demand effects play out for different
information sets. When private information is negative (low-demand state), there is
little need for the underwriter to underprice the issue. In contrast, when investors have
positive private information, their expected gains from lying are positive, and higher in
bad times than in good times. As a result, conditional on a high-demand state, the level
of underpricing will be higher when public information is negative rather than positive.11
Table 1 further shows that, conditional on negative public information, the probability
is higher that investors receive a negative (versus positive) private signal, and vice versa
for positive public information. Since the model predicts underpricing only when private
information is favorable, this implies that the probability of an issue being underpriced
is higher when the public signal is positive. Comparing the relative underpricing and
correlations across these different information sets will allow us to empirically test the
model, which we turn to next.
4 Empirical tests of the model
4.1 Sample selection and description
We identify 8,498 U.S. IPOs in the period 1970-2008 from the Global New Issues
databases in Thompson Financial’s SDC. Since the model analyzes the bookbuilding
process, we restrict the sample to 6,301 cases with a positive pricing range, i.e. with a
10See, e.g., Kyle (1985). In Chen and Wilhelm (2008) a similar effect in the IPO aftermarket leads
early stage investors to bid aggressively as they expect their information to become less important as
new informed investors enter the market.
11In reality, a substantial fraction of IPOs are overpriced. See, e.g., Ruud (1993) and Lowry, Officer,
and Schwert (2010).
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positive spread between the high and low filing price. Because SDC does not report a
filing range prior to 1981, this restriction effectively eliminates all IPOs in the 1970s.
We require firms to have a filing midpoint of at least $5 per share, to be listed
in CRSP, and to be traded by the 40th trading day after the public listing on NYSE,
AMEX or NASDAQ. All unit offerings, real estate investment trusts (REITs), American
depository receipts (ADRs), and closed-end funds are eliminated. We further require
the IPO firm to have a founding year in the Field-Ritter founding dataset and a lead
underwriter rank in the Ritter underwriter ranking dataset. Both these databases are
from Jay Ritter’s webpage at the University of Florida. Our final dataset consists of
5,093 IPOs in 1981-2008, all of which have a complete set of control variables.
Table 2 reports the number of cases, and the average first-day return and market
return by year. Two-thirds of the sample firms go public in the 1990s, one quarter in the
2000s and one tenth in the 1980s. Column 3 shows the first-day return IR1 = p1/p0−1,
where p1 is the firm’s closing price on the first day of trading and p0 is the final offer
price. To curb extreme outliers, we winsorize IR1 at 200%. All stock price data is from
CRSP. If there is no trade on a given day, we use the midpoint of the bid-ask spread.
The average one-day return is 19% and varies substantially over time. The largest
underpricing takes place in the years 1999 and 2000, with a mean first-day return of
63% and 54%, respectively. In contrast, the average IR1 never exceeds 6% in any one
year during the 1984-1989 period. In the empirical analysis below, we use the first-day
return (IR1) as a proxy for the underpricing of the offering.
The next three columns of Table 2 show the return on the S&P500 index over the 45
trading days preceding the IPO issue date (SP500), and the proportion of IPOs that take
place in positive (SP500 > 0) and negative (SP500 ≤ 0) market conditions, respectively.
The average pre-issue market return is 2.7% and three-quarters of the sample IPOs are
issues in bull markets. Interestingly, also in the years 1998-2000, at least one quarter
of the issues (ranging from 21%-42% per year) take place in a downmarket. In the
following, we use the S&P500 45-day return as a proxy for the public information that
reaches investors during the bookbuilding period. We choose a 45-day window to match
the number of trading days in the registration period for a typical IPO in our sample.
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4.2 Univariate analysis
In the model, the expected underpricing depends on the relative size of the two
counteracting effects of public information on investors’ incentives and their demand
for allocations. On the one hand, when public information is negative, underwriters
must underprice the issue more in order to induce investors to reveal their positive
private information (the incentive effect). On the other hand, since public and private
signals are conditionally correlated, the demand for shares in the IPO—and thus the
likelihood that the issue is underpriced—is lower when publicly available information is
negative (the demand effect). These two effects imply several empirical patterns. First,
for a given increase in private information, we should observe more underpricing in
downmarkets than in upmarkets. Second, when public information is positive, investors
are more likely to also have favorable private information and the proportion underpriced
offerings should be higher. In the following, we test these predictions in several different
ways. We start by examining the univariate differences in underpricing across various
information sets.
Testing the model requires a measure for private information. Since private informa-
tion in itself is unobservable, we follow Hanley (1993) and turn to the outcome of the
bookbuilding process. As discussed above, the objective of this process is to uncover
investors’ private information. Any revision in the final offer price from the indicated
price in the initial filing range will—at least partly—reflect new information revealed
by investors to the underwriter during the road show. We define the price update as
PU = p0/pmid − 1, where pmid is the filing range midpoint. Using PU as a proxy for
private information assumes that all information reflected in the price update is private,
also if it overlaps with concurrent public information.
Table 3 reports the average initial return (IR1) split by positive (SP500 > 0) and
negative (SP500 ≤ 0) public information, respectively. Variable definitions and data
sources are shown in Table 4. In Panel A of table 3, the sample is further split by
the sign of the price update (positive, zero, and negative). Interestingly, the univariate
results for different information sets are consistent with the empirical patterns predicted
by the model. When private information is bad (PU < 0), the level of underpricing is
relatively small, with average initial returns of 5% in upmarkets and 4% in downmarkets.
Consistent with Benveniste and Spindt (1989), the level of underpricing is much higher
when private information is good (PU > 0). Unique to our model predictions, however,
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the average underpricing conditional on positive private information is particularly high
when the issue takes place in a downmarket (IR1 = 42%) compared to in an upmarket
(IR1 = 35%). Also, when public information is positive (SP500 > 0), a higher fraction
of the issues involve positive rather than negative private information (48% vs. 40%),
while the opposite holds when public markets are down (33% IPOs with a positive vs.
55% IPOs with a negative price update).
As pointed out above, the final revision of the offer price (PU) accounts for broadly
available information that reaches the market during the registration period. To isolate
information that is truly private, we compute a measure for investors’ private informa-
tion, Private, that purges the content of market-wide information from the offer price
revision. Specifically, Private is the residual from the regression PU = β ∗ SP500 + .
In other words, Private is any information in the price revision above and beyond what
can easily be inferred from the public markets. It is the result of the extreme view that
nothing but information in the price update that cannot be attributed to the public
signal is considered to be private.12
For a total of 616 cases, the final offer price equals the mid-point of the offer range,
so that PU = 0. It is difficult to know if the absence of a price revision is because
any new information revealed during the bookbuilding process is marginal, or if the
private information is perfectly offset by public information that reaches the market
over the same time period. In any event, our estimation of Private mechanically forces
a negative correlation between SP500 and the private information variable for issues
with no revision in the final offer price. In the empirical analysis below, we characterize
these cases as bookbuilding processes that fail to generate any new private information,
and thus set Private to zero when PU = 0. For robustness, we also run all regressions
(i) eliminating the 616 cases where PU = 0, (ii) using the original residual also when
PU = 0, and (iii) using PU as a proxy for private information. While not reported in
the paper, all results remain the same for any of these alternative proxies for private
information.13 Panel B of table 3 shows the average first-day return split by the sign of
Private. Interestingly, this split generates initial return averages that closely map the
12Although the price revision has been shown to vary with other offer characteristics (e.g. stock
exchange, total proceeds raised, underwriter rank, etc.), these characteristics are known already at the
beginning of the bookbuilding process and therefore do not represent new information in our setting.
13The exception is the second definition, which mechanically forces a negative correlation between
private and public information when PU = 0, and hence produces a negative sign on the coefficient for
SP500 in the probit regressions reported in Table 7 below. All regression results are available from the
authors on request.
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ones reported for PU in Panel A.
As in Benveniste and Spindt (1989), our model predicts underpricing only when in-
vestor demand is high. We therefore create three dummy variables that indicate whether
or not the final offer price is set outside the initial filing range. The high-demand state
(HDS) represents IPOs where the offer price is on or above the upper bound of the
filing range. Similarly, the low-demand state (LDS) indicates bookbuilding processes
that yield an offer price on or below the lower bound of the filing range. Finally, the
medium-demand state (MDS) indicates that the final offer price is within the initial
filing range.
Panel C of Table 3 shows the average first-day returns across the three demand states.
A similar pattern as for PU and Private emerges. Again, the average first-day return is
marginal (4%-5%) in the low-demand state, and higher in the high-demand state when
the S&P500 return is negative (48%) vs. positive (38%). Also, most offerings (48%) are
in LDS when markets are down, while most offerings (42%) are in HDS when markets
are up. Overall, the predictions of the model seem to hold in the univariate across our
different proxies for private information. We next test if the incentive and demand effects
also hold in the cross-section.
4.3 Tests of the incentive effect
When the private signal is negative, investors have little incentive to hide their infor-
mation. In contrast, in order to persuade investors to reveal positive private information,
underwriters have to underprice the offering. A novel and central prediction of our model
is that investors require more underpricing to reveal their private signal in downmarkets
than in upmarkets. We test this prediction by regressing the initial return (IR1) on our
proxy for private information (Private), split by different public information sets. The
first regression specification is:
IR1 = α+ β1 Private ∗SP500POS + β2Private ∗SP500NEG + β3SP500POS + e. (10)
SP500POS and SP500NEG are two mutually exclusive dummy variables. The vari-
able SP500POS takes the value of one if the 45-day pre-issue market return is pos-
itive (SP500 > 0) and SP500NEG = 1 if SP500 ≤ 0. The interaction variables
Private ∗SP500POS and Private ∗SP500NEG hence capture the effect of private infor-
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mation on underpricing when public information is positive and negative, respectively.
Our model predicts that β1 < β2. We further include the dummy SP500POS separately
to allow for the two interaction variables to have different intercepts.
The second regression specification is:
IR1 = γ + δ1Private+ δ2Private ∗ SP500POS + δ3SP500POS + u. (11)
This equation provides a direct test of whether the two coefficients β1 and β2 are different
from each other. Specifically, the coefficient δ2 for Private ∗ SP500POS is such that
δ2 = β1 − β2, and we predict δ2 < 0.14
The coefficient estimates from ordinary least squares (OLS) estimations of the initial
return are shown in Table 5. The t-statistics reported in parenthesis use White (1980)
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. The first regression simply verifies that
prior findings of partial adjustment to private and public information also hold in our
sample. If the final offer price is fully adjusted to information revealed during the regis-
tration period, our information variables should be uncorrelated to the first-day return.
As shown in column (1), however, the coefficient on Private is positive and highly signif-
icant (p-value <0.001). That is, the final offer price is only partially adjusted for private
information revealed during the bookbuilding process, consistent with the Benveniste
and Spindt (1989) model. Moreover, by including both SP500 and SP500POS , we fol-
low Lowry and Schwert (2004) and allow for the partial adjustment to be asymmetric
with respect to positive and negative public information. The coefficient for SP500 is
positive and significant, consistent with the standard result of partial adjustment to
public information. The coefficient for SP500POS , however, is marginal and of a much
smaller magnitude, suggesting that the effect of public information on initial returns
largely is symmetric.
The next two regressions use the specifications presented in equations (10) and (11),
respectively. As shown in columns (2) and (3), the coefficients for Private ∗ SP500POS
and Private ∗ SP500NEG are β1 = 0.89 and β2 = 1.08, respectively, both highly signifi-
cant from zero. Moreover, the difference between the two coefficients, δ2, is negative with
14To see why, note that equation (11) can be rewritten as
IR1 = γ + δ1Private ∗ (SP500POS + SP500NEG) + δ2Private ∗ SP500POS + δ3SP500POS + u, or
IR1 = γ + (δ1 + δ2)Private ∗ SP500POS + δ1Private ∗ SP500NEG + δ3SP500POS + u.
Compare this with equation (10) and it is obvious that δ1 + δ2 = β1 and δ1 = β2, such that δ2 = β1−β2.
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a p-value < 0.01. This result is consistent with the notion that investors require more
underpricing in downmarkets than in upmarkets to reveal a given amount of private
information, as predicted by the model.
The last three columns of table 5 add other characteristics of the offering that have
previously been shown to affect IPO initial returns. These control variables include the
logarithm of the number of years since the firm was founded (Age), the logarithm of
the total $ proceeds raised in the IPO (Proceeds), the logarithm of the total number of
shares sold in the issue (Shares), and the average rank of the lead underwriter (Rank).
Underwriters are ranked on a scale from 0 to 9, where a higher number imply higher
underwriter quality. We further add dummy variables indicating that the firm is in a
high-tech industry (HighTech), is listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NY SE)
or NASDAQ (NASDAQ), and that the IPO takes place in the period 9/1998-8/2000
(Bubble), respectively.
Many of the control variables produce significant coefficients. The initial returns
are decreasing in firm age and the $ proceeds raised in the IPO, and increasing in
the number of shares offered and the average rank of the lead underwriter. Moreover,
first-day returns tend to be higher for high-tech firms and offerings during the bubble
period. Importantly, the empirical predictions of our model hold also when including
control variables in the regressions. As reported in columns (5) and (6), the coefficients
β1 = 0.79 and β2 = 0.94 are both still positive and highly significant. Also, β1 < β2,
with the difference being significantly different from zero at the 5%-level.15 In sum, the
data supports the existence of our incentive effect.
One implication of the model is that underpricing is required only in the high-demand
state—and not in the low-demand state—in order to induce investors to truthfully reveal
their private information. As a further test of the incentive effect, we examine the
impact of the interaction variables Private∗SP500POS and Private∗SP00NEG on IR1
separately for the different demand states: high, medium and low. The results from
OLS regressions with the first-day underpricing as dependent variable are presented in
table 6. As before, the t-statistics (in parenthesis) use White (1980) heteroscedasticity-
consistent standard errors. All regressions include the full set of controls discussed above.
While not shown in the table for expositional purposes, all the control variables receive
coefficients of similar magnitude and significance as in Table 5.
15The regressions produce a two-sided t-test of the difference, while the model in fact only requires a
one-sided t-test of the difference, effectively doubling the significance of the test.
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The first column of Table 6 shows how the first-day return varies across different
demand states and with private information. The initial returns tend to be lowest in
the low-demand state, with a coefficient for LDS of -0.05 and highest in the high-
demand state, with a coefficient for HDS of 0.05, both significant at the 0.1%-level
(relative to the medium-demand state). Moreover, the change in the first-day return for
a given change in private information is highest in the high-demand state (the coefficient
for Private ∗HDS is 1.06 and highly significant); intermediate in the medium-demand
state (the coefficient for Private∗MDS is 0.44 with a p-value< 0.001); and insignificant
from zero in the low-demand state. As shown in column (2), these three coefficients are
significantly different from each other (p < 0.001). This suggests that the compensation
investors require for truthfully disclosing their private information is highest in the high-
demand state and close to zero in the low-demand state, as predicted by the model.
The remaining two columns of Table 6 examine the coefficient for Private condi-
tional on positive and negative public information, respectively, and across the low- and
high-demand states. From columns (3) and (4), the coefficient for Private ∗ HDS is
significantly smaller in upmarkets than in downmarkets (0.99 vs. 1.32, and different
at the 1%-level), while the coefficient for Private ∗ LDS is close to zero and insignif-
icantly different across the two public information sets (i.e., the two coefficients for
Private ∗ LDS ∗ SP500POS and Private ∗ LDS ∗ SP500NEG are not significantly dif-
ferent).16 To sum up, the regression results suggest that the underpricing compensating
investors for private information is largely associated with the high-demand state.
Overall, the regression results support the existence of the incentive effect as pre-
dicted by the model. Investors’ incentives to reveal their private information—and
therefore the required level of underpricing—depends on nature of the public informa-
tion. Specifically, investors require less compensation to disclose favorable private signals
when market-wide prospects are optimistic than when the public outlook is poor. Hav-
ing empirically established the existence of the incentive effect in the data, we now turn
to tests of the effects of private and public information on investors’ demand for shares.
16Cornelli, Goldreich, and Ljungqvist (2006) find that grey-market trading by individual investors on
a forward (when-issued) basis is informative for the aftermarket price only when demand is high (versus
low).
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4.4 Tests of the demand effect
In general, investors’ demand for IPO allocations depends on their private informa-
tion: the better the private signal, the higher demand for shares in the IPO. In our
model, the demand effect stems from the positive conditional correlation between public
and private information, based on the assumption that public and private signals both
are informative. Given positive public information, it is likely that the private signal also
is favorable. This is the first implication of the demand effect that we test. Moreover,
given the higher likelihood that investors have positive private signals, their demand
and thus the proportion underpriced IPOs should be higher when public information is
positive rather than negative. This is the second implication of the demand effect that
we test.
Table 7 shows the coefficient estimates from probit regressions for the probability
that the private information revealed during the bookbuilding process is positive versus
negative (PrivatePOS). As discussed above, the model predicts that public and private
information are positively correlated. This prediction is borne out in the data. As shown
in columns (1) and (2), the coefficient is positive and highly significant (p<0.001) both
for the continuous variable SP500 and the dummy variable SP500POS . Thus, although
Private by construction is orthogonal to SP500 with respect to the final revision of the
offer price (PU), Private is still positively correlated to the public information (SP500),
as predicted by the model. When including both market return variables at the same
time in column (3), only the coefficient for SP500POS is significant, suggesting that it
is the direction of the public information more than its magnitude that matters for the
sign of the private signal.
The effect of public information on the likelihood of positive private information
seems robust. In particular, the addition of control variables do no affect the sign or
significance of the coefficients for SP500 or SP500POS , as shown in columns (4)-(6).
The probability for positive private information is decreasing in firm age, the number of
shares offered, and the lead underwriter rank, and increasing in the size of the proceeds
raised in the offering. Moreover, high-tech firms and IPOs during the bubble years tend
to be associated with the revelation of positive private information.
In Table 8, we report the coefficients from probit regressions estimating the prob-
ability that the IPO is in a high-demand state and a low-demand state, respectively.
Recall that, in the model, all investors must have positive private signals in order for
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the high-demand state to occur. Thus, the high-demand state can be viewed as a more
coarse—and therefore more robust—proxy for issues with positive private information.
Columns (1)-(4) reports the results from probit regressions where the high-demand state
indicator (HDS) is the dependent variable. All coefficient estimates and significance
levels are qualitatively the same as in the regressions for positive private information re-
ported in Table 7 above. Specifically, the probability of pricing an issue above the filing
range (HDS) is higher in upmarkets and increases with the size of the market return.
As expected, the opposite results are obtained when a dummy for the low-demand state
(LDS) is the dependent variable, as shown in columns (5)-(8). Here, the probability for
an issue to be priced below its filing range is lower in upmarkets and decreases with the
return on the market index during the registration period.
We next test the effect of public information on the likelihood that the first-day
return is positive. Table 9 reports the coefficient estimates from probit regressions of
the determinants of a positive (versus negative) first-day return (IR1POS). Again, and
as predicted by the model, the coefficients for SP500 and SP500POS are positive and
significant at the 0.1%-level. The higher the pre-issue market return, the more likely is
the initial return to be positive. Moreover, when including SP500 and SP500POS at
the same time, reported in column (3), both variables produce positive and significant
coefficients, suggesting that the effect is asymmetric across positive and negative market
returns. In other words, the likelihood of a positive first-day return increases with the
pre-issue market return, and in particular so when the market-wide return is positive.
While public information helps predict the occurrence of underpricing, the variable
Private also produces a positive and significant coefficient (p<0.001). That is, the more
favorable the private information, the more likely is the offer to have a positive first-day
return. This result is robust across all six regression specifications. Finally, columns
(4)-(6) add our standard control variables. As shown in the table, the probability that
the first-day return is positive decreases with the size of the offering (Proceeds) and is
higher the more shares that are issued (Shares) and for firms listed on NASDAQ and
NYSE (versus AMEX).
Overall, our tests support the existence of the incentive effect as well as the demand
effect. Our model is interesting because it provides a rational explanation for partial
adjustment of the offer price to public information. The novel mechanism is the incentive
effect, which ties the sign of public information to investors’ incentives to reveal their
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positive private signals. As predicted by the model, and played out in the data, investors
receive more compensation for positive private information in downmarkets than in
upmarkets. Moreover, the counteracting demand effect, implying a higher probability
of positive private information and hence underpricing in bull markets than in bear
markets, also receives strong support by the data. Combined, these two effects—and the
way public information affects investors’ incentives to disclose private information—can
help explain the partial adjustment to public information that has been observed by
many.
5 Summary
This paper presents a model that explains the relationship between public infor-
mation and IPO initial returns. Building on the framework of Benveniste and Spindt
(1989), where investors are compensated with underpriced shares for disclosing private
information, we show that publicly available information is related to IPO underpricing
through two different mechanisms.
First, and unique to our model, market-wide information affects the underpricing
required for investors to reveal their positive private signal. When the public outlook is
negative, the expected profits from hiding favorable private information is higher. Ac-
cordingly, investors require a higher compensation—in the form of more underpricing—to
disclose good news when public information is bad. This is the incentive effect.
Second, because public and private signals are informative, they are also conditionally
correlated. That is, the probability of receiving a good private signal given a positive
market outlook is higher than if the market outlook is poor. Consequently, investors are
more likely to have positive signals—which is necessary for the issue to be underpriced
in the first place—in upmarkets than in downmarkets. As a result, the probability that
an issue is underpriced is higher when public information is positive. This is the demand
effect.
Whether underpricing ultimately is positively or negatively related to public infor-
mation depends on which of the two effects dominates. If the number of investors in the
offering is sufficiently large, the demand effect will dominate and initial IPO returns will
be increasing in pre-issue market returns. Our model thus allows for the possibility of
either under- or over adjustment to public information in the offer price.
We test the predictions of the model for a sample of 5,000 U.S. IPOs in 1981-2008. As
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a proxy for private information, we use the residual from an OLS regression of the final
offer price revision on the pre-issue market returns. This purges any effect of market-
wide information from the price revision, attributing the remaining change to investors’
private signals.
In cross-sectional tests, we show that for a given change in private information, initial
returns change more in downmarkets than in upmarkets. In other words, investors’
private information is more completely incorporated into the IPO price when the pre-
issue market-wide returns are positive rather than negative. This effect is particularly
pronounced for issues that are priced above the filing range and largely absent in issues
that are priced below the filing range. This is consistent with the incentive effect.
We also find a positive correlation between public and private information—despite
the orthogonalization procedure described above—and between public information and
the probability that the issue is priced above its initial filing range, as well as a positive
correlation between market returns and the probability of a positive first-day return.
This is all consistent with the demand affect.
Our model provides a rational explanation for partial adjustment in the offer price to
public information, as observed by many others. One potential extension is to explore the
mechanisms that determine the relative strengths of the demand and the incentive effects.
Another extension is to develop the model’s predictions with respect to the volatility of
initial returns and examine how return volatility is affected by market conditions. Both
extensions will help us better understand the larger mechanisms behind IPO pricing and
allocations.
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A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.
(i) The initial return associated with the high-demand state equals
r(N, s) =
v(N, s)
p(N, s)
− 1; s = {b, g}, (12)
where
p(N, s) = v(N, s)− q(1, gI , s)
q(N, gI , s)
[v(1, s)− v(0, s)] . (13)
We want to show that r(N, g) < r(N, b), or that
v(N, g)
p(N, g)
≤ v(N, b)
p(N, b)
, (14)
which is equivalent to
q(N, gI , g)v(N, g)
q(N, gI , b)v(N, b)
≥ q(1, gI , g)
q(1, gI , b)
[v(1, g)− v(0, g)]
[v(1, b)− v(0, b)] (15)
Using Bayes rule and rearranging, this inequality may be written
1 ≥ γ − (1− γ)Ξ
γ − (1− γ)Θ , (16)
where
Ξ =
(1− γ)N−1γfα+ γN−1(1− γ)(1− f)(1− α)
(1− γ)Nfα+ γN (1− f)(1− α) (17)
and
Θ =
(1− γ)N−1γ(1− f)α+ γN−1f(1− α)
(1− γ)N (1− f)α+ γNf(1− α) (18)
To prove the proposition, we need to show that Ξ − Θ ≥ 0. To see that this inequality
is satisfied, note that Ξ−Θ can be rearranged so that
Ξ−Θ = α(1− α)(2f − 1)[(1− γ)
N−1γN+1 − γN−1(1− γ)N + γN (1− γ)N ]
[(1− γ)Nfα+ γN (1− f)(1− α)] [(1− γ)N (1− f)α+ γNf(1− α)] (19)
=
α(1− α)(2f − 1)(1− γ)N−1γN−1(2γ − 1)
[(1− γ)Nfα+ γN (1− f)(1− α)] [(1− γ)N (1− f)α+ γNf(1− α)] , (20)
which is strictly positive since f, γ > 1/2.
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(ii) By Bayes’ rule it follows that
q(N |g) = γ
Nfα+ (1− γN )(1− f)(1− α)
fα+ (1− f)(1− α) (21)
and
q(N |b) = γ
N (1− f)α+ (1− γN )f(1− α)
(1− f)α+ f(1− α) (22)
The difference between the two may be written
q(N |g)− q(N |b) = α(1− α)(2f − 1)[γ
N − (1− γ)N ]
[1− α(1− f)− (1− α)f ][α(1− f) + f(1− α)] , (23)
which is strictly greater than zero.
Proof of Proposition 2.
The proposition is proved by showing that
lim
N→∞
Er(g)
Er(b)
> 1 (24)
By Bayes’ rule and straightforward algebra it follows that
Er(g)
Er(b)
=
(1− f)α+ f(1− α)
fα+ (1− f)(1− α) ×
fα+ (1−γγ )
N (1− f)(1− α)
(1− f)α+ (1−γγ )Nf(1− α)
×A, (25)
where
A =
(1− f)α
[(
1−γ
γ
)N
(1− f)α+ f(1− α)
]
− f(1− f)α(1− α) 1γ
(
1−γ
γ
)N−1
(2γ − 1)
fα
[(
1−γ
γ
)N
fα+ (1− f)(1− α)
]
− f(1− f)α(1− α) 1γ
(
1−γ
γ
)N−1
(2γ − 1)
(26)
Recalling that γ > 1/2 and hence that 1−γγ < 1 it follows that
lim
N→∞
Er(g)
Er(b)
=
(1− f)α+ f(1− α)
fα+ (1− f)(1− α) ×
f
1− f . (27)
It is now straightforward to show that the right hand side of (29) is strictly greater than
one, which completes the proof.
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Table 2: Sample return characteristics by year
The table shows the annual distribution of the sample of 5,093 U.S. IPOs in 1981-2008, and the average
first-day return and stock market return by year. The first-day return is IR1 = p1/p0 − 1, where p1 is
the closing price on the first trading day and p0 is the offer price, winsorized at 200%. The return on
the S&P500 index (SP500) is measured over the 45 trading days preceding the issue. Market conditions
report the proportion of IPOs that take place in a positive market (SP500 > 0) and negative market
(SP500 ≤ 0), respectively.
Listing Sample First-day S&P500 Market conditions:
year size return return proportion proportion
(N) (IR1) (SP500) positive negative
1981 4 3.9% -1.5% 50.0% 50.0%
1982 1 4.7% 1.6% 100.0% 0.0 %
1983 14 11.1% 2.5% 71.4% 28.6%
1984 10 2.0% 1.9% 40.0% 60.0%
1985 46 5.4% 4.0% 78.3% 21.7%
1986 207 4.1% 2.6% 70.0% 30.0%
1987 194 5.6% 6.3% 88.7% 11.3%
1988 72 4.8% 2.0% 63.9% 36.1%
1989 58 5.7% 4.4% 72.4% 27.6%
1990 69 9.2% 0.3% 60.9% 39.1%
1991 226 10.9% 1.4% 58.4% 41.6%
1992 305 9.0% 2.1% 66.6% 33.4%
1993 417 11.6% 1.4% 82.5% 17.5%
1994 324 8.7% -0.6% 45.1% 54.9%
1995 359 20.5% 5.1% 99.7% 0.3%
1996 571 15.9% 4.1% 82.1% 17.9%
1997 381 14.2% 5.3% 83.7% 16.3%
1998 256 20.8% 5.4% 78.9% 21.1%
1999 421 63.4% 2.5% 73.2% 26.8%
2000 323 53.8% 0.2% 57.9% 42.1%
2001 68 14.6% 0.2% 48.5% 51.5%
2002 49 8.0% -3.8% 26.5% 73.5%
2003 53 12.7% 4.1% 92.5% 7.5%
2004 162 12.2% 1.7% 64.2% 35.8%
2005 162 11.7% 1.2% 65.4% 34.6%
2006 168 11.4% 2.5% 81.0% 19.0%
2007 157 13.3% 2.0% 66.2% 33.8%
2008 16 2.4% -3.3% 50.0% 50.0%
Total 5,093 19.2% 2.7% 73.1% 26.9%
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Table 3: First-day returns split by positive and negative information
The table shows the average first-day return, split by positive and negative public information (SP500),
respectively. The first-day return is IR1 = p1/p0 − 1, where p1 is the closing price on the first trading
day and p0 is the offer price, winsorized at 200%. The table shows a further split by the sign of the
final revision of the offer price (PU , Panel A), the price update residual (Private, Panel B), and the
demand state (HDS/MDS/LDS, Panel C). All variables are defined in Table 4. The sample is 5,093
U.S. IPOs, 1981-2008.
Panel A: Price update (PU)
Public information: Positive (SP500 > 0) Negative (SP500 ≤ 0)
Price update: Positive Zero Negative Positive Zero Negative
First-day return (IR1) 34.7% 11.0% 4.6% 42.4% 12.1% 3.5%
Number of cases, N 1788 448 1485 455 168 749
Percent of cases 48% 12% 40% 33% 12% 55%
Panel B: Price update residual (Private)
Public information: Positive (SP500 > 0) Negative (SP500 ≤ 0)
Private information: Positive Zero Negative Positive Zero Negative
First-day return (IR1) 35.5% 11.0% 4.9% 41.5% 12.1% 3.5%
Number of cases, N 1724 448 1549 466 168 738
Percent of cases 46% 12% 42% 34% 12% 54%
Panel C: Demand state (HDS/MDS/LDS)
Public information: Positive (SP500 > 0) Negative (SP500 ≤ 0)
Demand state: High Medium Low High Medium Low
First-day return (IR1) 37.9% 9.4% 4.5% 47.5% 9.0% 3.5%
Number of cases, N 1577 880 1264 396 320 656
Percent of cases 42% 24% 34% 29% 23% 48%
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Table 4: Variable definitions
The table shows names and definitions of, and sources for, the variables used in the analysis. Jay Ritter
refers to his webpage at the University of Florida. p0 is the final offer price.
Name Definition Sources
A: Variables critical for testing the model
IR1 One-day initial return, defined as IR1 = p1/p0 − 1, where p1 is the firm’s
closing price on the first trading day, winsorized at 200%. Proxy for un-
derpricing.
SDC, CRSP
SP500 Return on the S&P500 index over the 45 trading days preceding the offer
(the book building period). Proxy for public information.
CRSP
PU Revision in the final offer price from the initial filing range midpoint (price
update), defined as PU = p0/pmid − 1, where pmid is the midpoint of the
filing range.
SDC
Private The residual () from the regression of the price update on the S&P500
return: PU = β ∗ SP500 + , and set to zero when PU = 0. Proxy for
private information.
SDC, CRSP
POS, NEG The subscript POS and NEG indicate a dummy taking the value of one if
the variable is positive and non-positive, respectively.
HDS Dummy indicating that the final offer price is above the initial filing range
(high demand state), defined as p0 ≥ pH , where pH is the upper bound of
the filing range.
SDC
LDS Dummy indicating that the final offer price is below the initial filing range
(low demand state), defined as p0 ≤ pL, where pL is the lower bound of
the filing range.
SDC
MDS Dummy indicating that the final offer price is within the initial filing range
(medium demand state), defined as pL < p0 < pH , where pL and pH are
the lower and upper bound, respectively, of the filing range.
SDC
B: Control variables
Age Log of firm age since the founding year. Jay Ritter
Proceeds Log of total $ proceeds raised in the IPO. SDC
Shares Log of total number of shares sold in the IPO. SDC
Rank Average rank of the lead underwriter. Jay Ritter
HighTech Dummy indicating that the IPO is done by a high-technology firm. SDC
Bubble Dummy indicating that the IPO took place in the period 9/1998-8/2000. SDC
NASDAQ Dummy indicating that the firm lists on NASDAQ. CRSP
NY SE Dummy indicating that the firm lists on New York Stock Exchange. CRSP
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Table 5: Tests of the incentive effect (I)
Tests of the incentive effect using OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the first-day return
(IR1). All variables are defined in Table 4. The t-statistics (in parenthesis) use White’s (1980)
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. +, *, **, and *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%,
1%, and 0.01% level, respectively. The sample is 5,093 U.S. IPOs in 1981-2008.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Private 0.939∗∗∗ 1.082∗∗∗ 0.829∗∗∗ 0.943∗∗∗
(28.93) (17.47) (24.98) (17.08)
Private ∗ SP500POS 0.890∗∗∗ -0.192∗∗ 0.793∗∗∗ -0.150∗
(23.98) (-2.66) (21.63) (-2.42)
Private ∗ SP500NEG 1.082∗∗∗ 0.943∗∗∗
(17.47) (17.08)
SP500POS -0.0236
+ -0.0277∗ -0.0277∗ -0.0225∗ -0.0256∗ -0.0256∗
(-1.93) (-2.15) (-2.15) (-2.04) (-2.22) (-2.22)
SP500 0.339∗∗ 0.351∗∗ 0.351∗∗ 0.404∗∗∗ 0.415∗∗∗ 0.415∗∗∗
(2.74) (2.85) (2.85) (3.70) (3.80) (3.80)
Age -0.0120∗∗∗ -0.0119∗∗∗ -0.0119∗∗∗
(-4.50) (-4.47) (-4.47)
Proceeds -0.0529∗∗ -0.0558∗∗∗ -0.0558∗∗∗
(-3.24) (-3.46) (-3.46)
Shares 0.0525∗∗ 0.0559∗∗ 0.0559∗∗
(2.73) (2.95) (2.95)
Rank 0.00331∗ 0.00339∗∗ 0.00339∗∗
(2.57) (2.63) (2.63)
HighTech 0.0434∗∗∗ 0.0446∗∗∗ 0.0446∗∗∗
(6.56) (6.70) (6.70)
Bubble 0.324∗∗∗ 0.321∗∗∗ 0.321∗∗∗
(15.91) (15.82) (15.82)
NASDAQ 0.0239+ 0.0230 0.0230
(1.71) (1.63) (1.63)
NY SE -0.00983 -0.0101 -0.0101
(-0.62) (-0.63) (-0.63)
Constant 0.205∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗ 0.261∗∗∗ 0.262∗∗∗ 0.262∗∗∗
(23.88) (22.66) (22.66) (4.20) (4.21) (4.21)
Adjusted R2 0.364 0.367 0.367 0.487 0.488 0.488
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Table 6: Tests of the incentive effect (II)
Tests of the incentive effect using OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the first-day return (IR1).
All variables are defined in Table 4. The control variables (not shown here) are the same as in table 5.
The t-statistics (in parenthesis) use White’s (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. +, *,
**, and *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, 1%, and 0.01% level, respectively. The sample is 5,093
U.S. IPOs in 1981-2008.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Private 0.443∗∗∗
(4.36)
Private ∗HDS 1.056∗∗∗ 0.612∗∗∗ 1.317∗∗∗
(14.59) (5.04) (11.59)
Private ∗MDS 0.443∗∗∗ 0.503∗∗∗ 0.503∗∗∗
(4.36) (4.98) (4.98)
Private ∗ LDS 0.0543 -0.389∗∗∗ 0.0270
(1.42) (-3.76) (0.52)
Private ∗HDS ∗ SP500POS 0.987∗∗∗ -0.329∗∗
(13.04) (-2.72)
Private ∗HDS ∗ SP500NEG 1.317∗∗∗
(11.59)
Private ∗ LDS ∗ SP500POS 0.0867∗ 0.0597
(2.05) (1.09)
Private ∗ LDS ∗ SP500NEG 0.0270
(0.52)
HDS 0.0484∗∗∗ 0.0484∗∗∗ 0.0449∗∗∗ 0.0449∗∗∗
(3.84) (3.84) (3.67) (3.67)
LDS -0.0521∗∗∗ -0.0521∗∗∗ -0.0481∗∗∗ -0.0481∗∗∗
(-6.22) (-6.22) (-5.75) (-5.75)
SP500POS -0.0240
∗ -0.0240∗ 0.00298 0.00298
(-2.26) (-2.26) (0.22) (0.22)
SP500 0.314∗∗ 0.314∗∗ 0.337∗∗ 0.337∗∗
(2.89) (2.89) (3.12) (3.12)
Control variables: Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.525 0.525 0.529 0.529
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Table 7: Tests of the demand effect (I)
Tests of the demand effect using probit regressions. The dependent variable is a dummy for positive
private information (PrivatePOS). All variables are defined in Table 4. t-statistics are in parenthesis.
+, *, **, and *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, 1%, and 0.01% level, respectively. The sample is
5,093 U.S. IPOs in 1981-2008.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SP500 2.317∗∗∗ 0.418 1.724∗∗∗ -0.372
(6.11) (0.79) (4.03) (-0.63)
SP500POS 0.321
∗∗∗ 0.290∗∗∗ 0.295∗∗∗ 0.323∗∗∗
(7.93) (5.16) (6.45) (5.10)
Age -0.0813∗∗∗ -0.0823∗∗∗ -0.0825∗∗∗
(-4.13) (-4.17) (-4.18)
Proceeds 2.475∗∗∗ 2.479∗∗∗ 2.481∗∗∗
(33.02) (33.02) (33.00)
Shares -2.596∗∗∗ -2.603∗∗∗ -2.607∗∗∗
(-29.91) (-29.98) (-29.95)
Rank -0.0205∗∗ -0.0196∗ -0.0196∗
(-2.66) (-2.54) (-2.53)
HighTech 0.393∗∗∗ 0.395∗∗∗ 0.395∗∗∗
(8.81) (8.83) (8.84)
Bubble 0.401∗∗∗ 0.406∗∗∗ 0.406∗∗∗
(6.47) (6.53) (6.53)
NASDAQ 0.268∗ 0.260∗ 0.257∗
(2.12) (2.05) (2.02)
NY SE -0.0964 -0.0910 -0.0922
(-0.69) (-0.64) (-0.65)
Constant -0.240∗∗∗ -0.413∗∗∗ -0.402∗∗∗ -4.709∗∗∗ -4.825∗∗∗ -4.817∗∗∗
(-11.66) (-11.84) (-10.65) (-11.01) (-11.24) (-11.22)
Pseudo R2 0.005 0.009 0.009 0.234 0.238 0.238
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Table 9: Tests of the demand effect (III)
Probit regressions testing for the demand effect. The dependent variable is a dummy for positive
first-day returns (IR1POS). All variables are defined in Table 4. t-statistics are in parenthesis. +, *,
**, and *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, 1%, and 0.01% level, respectively. The sample is 5,093
U.S. IPOs in 1981-2008.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SP500 3.186∗∗∗ 2.302∗∗∗ 3.439∗∗∗ 2.625∗∗∗
(7.31) (3.74) (7.76) (4.21)
SP500POS 0.293
∗∗∗ 0.126∗ 0.304∗∗∗ 0.115+
(6.67) (2.02) (6.86) (1.84)
Private 2.658∗∗∗ 2.652∗∗∗ 2.653∗∗∗ 2.902∗∗∗ 2.868∗∗∗ 2.896∗∗∗
(22.82) (22.78) (22.78) (19.53) (19.38) (19.49)
Age 0.000403 -0.000504 0.000295
(0.02) (-0.03) (0.02)
Proceeds -0.259∗∗ -0.231∗∗ -0.258∗∗
(-3.20) (-2.88) (-3.19)
Shares 0.313∗∗∗ 0.272∗∗ 0.311∗∗∗
(3.36) (2.94) (3.33)
Rank 0.0112 0.0114 0.0115
(1.44) (1.47) (1.47)
HighTech 0.0823+ 0.0863+ 0.0839+
(1.81) (1.90) (1.85)
Bubble 0.0460 0.0500 0.0454
(0.66) (0.72) (0.65)
NASDAQ 0.403∗∗∗ 0.379∗∗∗ 0.397∗∗∗
(3.80) (3.59) (3.75)
NY SE 0.302∗ 0.293∗ 0.302∗
(2.45) (2.38) (2.45)
Constant 0.704∗∗∗ 0.573∗∗∗ 0.636∗∗∗ 0.0251 0.0501 -0.00576
(29.42) (15.21) (15.40) (0.06) (0.12) (-0.01)
Pseudo R2 0.118 0.117 0.119 0.126 0.124 0.127
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